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Amendments to the Russian Constitution take effect on 4 July 2020. In Chapter 3, “Federal 
Structure,” of the Constitution of the Russian Federation there is a provision for a set of 
amendments specifying the status of constitutional law in the Russian Federation regarding 
domestic and international/interstate relations as well as relating to questions of Russian 
national/state identity and guarantees of its preservation and protection. On 15 January 
2020 in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly a number of constitutional 
amendments were proposed for discussion, including the introduction of certain changes 
to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. These changes will be guaranteed priority 
in Russia’s legal framework. President Vladimir Putin noted that, “requirements of 
international law and treaties as well as decisions of international bodies can be valid on 
Russian territory only to the point that they do not restrict the rights and freedoms of our 
people and citizens and do not contradict our Constitution.”1 The topicality of considering 
the relationship between national and international court jurisdictions is predetermined 
by the fact that Russia has ratified Protocol No. 15. On 1 May 2017 a federal law-ratifying 
protocol establishing a subsidiary role of the European Court of Human Rights was signed. 
Such a role, in addition to the national mechanism of the judicial protection of human 
1  Presidential address to the Federal assembly, President of russia, 15 January 2020 (dec. 1, 2020), available 
at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62582.
POLINA VINOGRADOVA, ANDREY TULAEV 139
rights, is necessary to implement judicial protection, primarily in Russian courts including the 
Supreme Court (which is the highest court for civil, economic, criminal and administrative 
cases and which also protects human rights and freedoms by considering cassation and 
supervisory complaints against final and binding court rulings) and the Constitutional 
Court (which, as the highest court body of constitutional control, considers cases of citizens’ 
complaints about the violation of constitutional rights and freedoms by a law applied 
by state bodies). At the current level of legal development, there are both a necessity and 
practical possibility of altering approaches to the implementation of international rules. 
This paper considers the correlation of national and international law. On the basis of 
decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the so-called request for 
the applicability of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, legal views are given 
on the applicability of international rules by Russian courts, including their interpretation by 
international court institutions. The revised version of Article 101 of the Federal Constitutional 
Law on the Constitutional Court, which makes it possible to apply to the Constitutional Court 
contrary to an official ECHR decision, has been in effect since 2014.
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2. Positions of the Constitutional Court
3. Discussion and Conclusion
Introduction
the development of the institution of international treaties shows a progressive 
transformation of mechanisms and forms that harmonize the interests of various 
states. international treaties and their implementation by international organizations 
favor the formation of an international legal framework. the interrelationship between 
this system and the national legal system is secured by the law-enforcement activities 
of judicial authorities. a leading role in this sphere belongs to the Constitutional 
Court of the russian Federation (Constitutional Court), whose decisions are not only 
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obligatory for persons who are parties to a case but also predetermine the possibility 
of challenging rules in general. thus, in each case challenged rules are acknowledged 
as unconstitutional or their certain constitutional and legal meaning is established, 
changes which will affect all legal relations based on the rule in question. decisions 
of the Constitutional Court reflect correlations between national and international 
law, as well as mechanisms of the constitutional assessment of acts of conventional 
control as the basis for revision of court decisions.
the sources of russian law are defined by articles 15 and 76 of the russian 
Constitution. the inclusion of russia’s international treaties and universally 
acknowledged principles and rules of international law in the legal system as 
a subsystem does not mean ipso facto their inclusion into the system of the law of 
a state but rather imposes ties on both systems. the openness of intrastate law systems 
regarding the international legal system, their interaction and interpenetration 
become established on the principle of the sovereign equality of states in combination 
with the principles of justice and mutuality, independent of each other. every state, 
the more so a law-governed state, develops on the basis of its own legal system and, 
if it borrows some elements from other systems, they, becoming part of the new legal 
system, acquire a new quality that makes it possible to identify their belonging to 
this particular system and not any other one. thus, the international legal system and 
the russian legal system differ in their range of goals and objectives, sources of law, 
subjects of legal regulation and subjective compositions of privies. Some aspects of 
their target functions and legal objects overlap only partially. the basic interactions 
of these systems are defined in part 4 of article 15 of the russian Constitution. at 
the same time, there exists a common sphere in which international and intrastate 
legal rules can simultaneously affect the same object and the issue, consequently, is 
to define which law should prevail here.
despite differences in the continental and common-law legal systems, it is worth 
supporting the opinion of British lawyers on the applicability of international legal 
rules in the law-enforcement activities of states. international law is effective only 
insofar as its principles are acknowledged and perceived by our own internal law. 
there is no external force that imposes its rules on our own code of material or 
procedural law. Courts accept the existence of a body of rules that states have 
adopted in their relations with one another. on any issue touched upon in court, 
they attempt to establish what a corresponding rule represents and, having found 
it, consider it incorporated into internal law, since it is not incompatible with rules 
contained in laws or finally declared by intrastate courts.2 a commonly shared point 
of view holds that a peculiarity of international law is that international relations 
have no suprastate mechanisms that exercise compulsion and therefore the rules 
of international law are exercised by international legal entities themselves.
2  Броунли Я. Международное право: в 2 кн. Кн. 1 [ian Brownlie, International Law. In 2 books. Book 1] 
87 (1977).
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in line with the russian Constitution, international treaties are integral parts of 
the russian legal system, binding the state to enforce international court decisions 
based on them (part 4 of art. 15). an international treaty has a greater legal force 
under the russian law-enforcement process than a federal law, but not equal or 
greater than the legal force of the russian Constitution.
the implementation of international law in the russian legal system is acceptable 
if the following is observed. the harmonization of russian law with conventional 
ones is acceptable only insofar as it does not generate contradictions with the 
russian Constitution. the russian Constitution takes precedence in the russian 
legal system. therefore, it is inadmissible to implement international treaties in which 
participation may allow infringements on the foundations of the constitutional order. 
this also concerns the legal positions of the european Court that assess national law 
or suggest that its provisions should be changed. therefore, international treaties 
are subject to implementation within the russian legal system only if the russian 
Constitution is recognized to have the highest legal force.
a decision of the european Court may not be deemed binding if the meaning 
of a specific provision of the Convention, interpreted in violation of the normal rule 
of construction of a treaty, differs from the imperative rules of general international 
law (jus cogens), among which is the principle of sovereign equality and respect for 
the rights inherent in sovereignty as well as the principle of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of states.
it is now becoming accepted that
“the relationship between international and local law – and even less 
so between international and domestic courts – cannot be described by 
a simplistic monist or dualist framework”3 … and that “we should leave it 
at the existing divergences of national and transnational answers to the 
question of who has the last word.” in the era of pragmatism, working out 
mutually acceptable solutions for specific situations of disagreement is more 
important than setting up formal hierarchies.4
in this vein, top european national courts which at various points found 
themselves on a collision course with the eur. Ct. H.r. developed some sort 
of balancing tests to deal with conflicting decisions of the Strasbourg court 
and of their own. in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court [hereinafter 
FCC] declared in the Gorgulu case that German courts, on the one hand, “must 
3  andreas Paulus, A Comparative Look at Domestic Enforcement of International Tribunal Judgments, 103 
Proceedings of the annual meeting (american Society of international Law) 47 (2009). Cit. by Grigory vaypan, 
Acquiescence Affirmed, its Limits Left Undefined: The Markin Judgment and the Pragmatism of the Russian 
Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the European Court of Human Rights, 2(3) russian L.J. 130, 135 (2014).
4  Gertrude Luebbe-Wolff, Who Has the Last Word? National and Transnational Courts – Conflict and 
Cooperation, 30(1) yearbook of european Law 99 (2011). Cit. by vaypan 2014, at 135.
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give precedence to interpretation [of domestic law] in accordance with the 
Convention” but, on the other hand, must not enforce eur. Ct. H.r. decisions 
“in a schematic way” and “must include the effects [of eur. Ct. H.r. decisions] on 
the national legal system in their application of the law.” the FCC considered 
that lower courts may refuse to give domestic effect to the decision of the 
eur. Ct. H.r. “provided this is the only way in which a violation of fundamental 
principles of the constitution can be averted.” Given, however, the emphasis by 
the FCC on “the Basic Law’s commitment to international law,” the invocation of 
“fundamental principles of the constitution” may itself turn into a valuebalancing 
exercise. Similarly, the Supreme Court of the united Kingdom [hereinafter uK] 
opined in the Pinnock case that British courts should implement “a clear and 
constant line of [eur. Ct. H.r.] decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with 
some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of [British] law and whose 
reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument 
or point of principle.” accordingly, domestic courts may on “rare occasions” 
decline to follow the opinion of the eur. Ct. H.r. if doing so would foster 
“valuable dialogue” with the Strasbourg court on points of disagreement. and 
even though the practice of the uK Supreme Court manifests the existence of 
a “strong presumption” in favor of compliance with eur. Ct. H.r. rulings, on two 
occasions (in Boyd and Horncastle cases) the Supreme Court was successful 
in convincing the Grand Chamber of the eur. Ct. H.r. to reverse respective 
Chamber judgments regarding compatibility with the Convention of certain 
important aspects of uK law. Finally, the Constitutional Court of italy also laid 
down its balancing test in its decisions nos. 348/2007 and 311/2009 where it 
reserved for itself the right to determine, when deciding upon the effect of eur. 
Ct. H.r. rulings in the domestic legal system, “the reasonable balance between 
the constraint arising from international obligations, as imposed by art. 117, 
para. 1, of the Constitution, and the protection of constitutionally protected 
interests contained in other articles of the Constitution.” this balancing exercise 
may, according to the Constitutional Court of italy, justify non-implementation 
of eur. Ct. H.r. rulings in “exceptional” cases.5
By way of background should say a word about the stages of forming the legal 
grounds for the execution of decisions european Court of Human rights (hereafter 
“eCHr”).
1. Legal Basis
amendments to the russian Constitution take effect on 4 July 2020. they concern 
a number of social guarantees, expand the powers of parliament,
5  vaypan 2014, at 136–137.
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to improve the organisation and performance of public authority as 
an instrument to achieve constitutionally relevant goals that arise from 
provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the Constitution … Pursuant to the Law, 
decisions taken by supranational bodies in keeping with the provisions of the 
russian Federation’s international treaties shall not be enforced in the russian 
Federation if they contradict the Constitution of the russian Federation.6
decisions of interstate bodies adopted based on the provisions of 
international treaties ratified by russia in their interpretation that is contrary to 
the Constitution of the russian Federation will not be subject to enforcement. 
the contradiction shall be established by the Constitutional Court.7
at the same time, in order to avoid possible disputes about the legal and consti-
tutional nature of these provisions, the law on amendments provides for a procedure 
according to which the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation must assess 
the constitutionality of these amendments.
Pursuant to russian Federal Law no. 1-FKZ amending the Constitution of the 
russian Federation of 14 march 2020 with a view to “improving the regulation of 
individual questions of organisation and functioning of public authority” (hereinafter 
“the amending Law”), following the entry into force of that Law, the President of the 
russian Federation shall send a request to the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation, asking it to rule on the conformity with the provisions of Chapters 1, 2 
and 9 of the Constitution of the russian Federation of the provisions of that Law that 
have not yet entered into force, as well as the conformity with the russian Federation 
Constitution of the procedure for the entry into force of article 1 of that Law.
on 16 march 2020 the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation published 
its opinion on the request of the President of the russian Federation:
the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation adopted its opinion on 
the compliance with the provisions of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution of 
the russian Federation of the provisions of the Law of the russian Federation on 
the amendment of the Constitution of the russian Federation “on improving 
the regulation of certain issues of the organisation and functioning of public 
authority,” as well as on the conformity with the Constitution of the russian 
Federation of the entry into force of article 1 of this Law in connection with 
the request of the President of the russian Federation.8
6  Law on amendment to russian Federation Constitution, President of russia, 14 march 2020 (dec. 1, 2020), 
available at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/62988.
7  What Changes Will Be in the Constitution of the russian Federation?, the State duma, 12 march 2020 
(dec. 1, 2020), available at http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/48039/.
8  on 16 march 2020 the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation published its opinion on the request 
of the President of the russian Federation, Constitutional Court of the russian Federation, 16 march 
2020 (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/news/Pages/viewitem.aspx?Paramid=2192.
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the Constitutional Court underlined the connection of this amendment with 
the proposed amendment to article 125 of the Constitution, according to which the 
Constitutional Court shall rule on the possibility of executing decisions of interstate 
bodies taken on the basis of the provisions of the russian Federation’s international 
treaties in an interpretation that is contrary to the Constitution of the russian 
Federation and also on the possibility of executing decisions of an international/
interstate court or a foreign or international court of arbitration/mediation placing the 
russian Federation under obligations where such a decision is contrary to the tenets 
of public order in the russian Federation. the Constitutional Court found that,
these provisions, as follows directly from their wording, do not prescribe 
a repudiation by the russian Federation of compliance with the international 
treaties themselves and of the honouring of its international obligations and, 
accordingly, are not contrary to article 15 (paragraph 4) of the Constitution 
of the russian Federation. the given mechanism is not intended to establish 
a repudiation of execution of international treaties and the decisions of 
interstate court bodies based thereon but rather to devise a constitutionally 
acceptable means of executing such decisions by the russian Federation while 
steadfastly safeguarding the supreme legal authority of the russian Federation 
Constitution within the russian legal system, a component part of which is 
constituted by the unilateral and multilateral international treaties of russia, 
including those providing for the corresponding powers of interstate courts.9
the most relevant changes contained in the proposed draft amendments are 
focused at the present opinion of the european Commission for democracy through 
Law (venice commission) (CdL-ad(2020)009):
– declare that decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of 
international treaties of the russian Federation which collide with the Constitution 
may not be executed in the russian Federation;
– raise to the Constitutional level the ability of the Constitutional Court to 
resolve matters concerning the possibility of enforcing decisions of interstate bodies 
adopted on the basis of international treaties ratified by the russian Federation, in 
case they contradict the Constitution of the russian Federation.
the venice Commission has already had the occasion to stress that the 
domestic solutions in respect of the relation between the international and 
9  european Commission for democracy through Law (venice Commission), russian Federation, opinion 
on the draft amendments to the Constitution (as Signed by the President of the russian Federation on 
14 march 2020) related to the execution by the russian Federation of decisions by the european Court 
of Human rights, opinion no. 981/2020, CdL-ad(2020)009, 18 June 2020 (dec. 1, 2020), available at 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CdL-ad(2020)009-e.
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the domestic legal order are very diverse, and that there is a wide variety of 
choices as to the status of the eCHr in domestic law in relation to constitutional 
provisions. the choice of the relation between the national and the international 
systems is a sovereign one for each State to make. Similarly, the model of the 
division of power between the branches of the state (government, legislature 
and judiciary) is a matter for constitutional law (except where the state has 
undertaken specific international law obligations affecting this division,  
e.g. a duty to provide for judicial review in certain situations). Whatever model 
is chosen, however, the State is bound by international law under article 26 
of the vienna Convention on the Law on treaties (“Pacta sunt servanda”), 
which stipulates that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to 
it and must be performed by them in good faith.” article 27 of the vienna 
Convention (“internal law and observance of treaties”) further stipulates that 
“[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty ...” no legal argument at national law, including 
constitutional law, can justify an act or omission which turns out to be in 
breach of obligations stemming from international treaties which it has 
chosen to ratify. the execution of international obligations stemming from 
a treaty in force for a certain State is incumbent upon the State as a whole, 
i.e. all State bodies, including the Constitutional Court. in countries where the 
constitution has supremacy over international law, there exists the – remote – 
possibility that a constitutional court may find that the interpretation of an 
eCHr provision given by the european Court of Human rights collides with 
the domestic constitution. But this finding would not remove the obligation by 
that country to abide by a judgment rendered against it; in extreme cases, even 
the possibility of amending the Constitution could be envisaged. in the russian 
Federation the – certainly uncommon – competence of the Constitutional 
Court to examine the compatibility of a given modality of execution proposed 
by the Government agent (or other State organ) would not be problematic 
per se, should the matter remain on the agenda of the State institutions (the 
government, the parliament) which are responsible under international law 
for the enforcement of the judgment. the role of the Constitutional Court 
should be – as the Court itself has described it (see para 36 above) “to devise 
a constitutionally acceptable means of executing such decisions by the russian 
Federation while steadfastly safeguarding the supreme legal authority of the 
Constitution of the russian Federation within the russian legal system.” a case 
in which an international judgment may not be executed because its execution 
would collide with the Constitution cannot be but truly exceptional. instead, 
the russian Constitutional Court is empowered to declare that the judgment 
is non-executable as such in all cases where an issue of compatibility with 
the Constitution arises ... the Commission is concerned that the proposed 
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amendments enlarge the possibilities for the russian Constitutional Court to 
declare that decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions 
of international treaties of the russian Federation which collide with the 
Constitution may not be executed in the russian Federation. indeed, the 
proposed amendments use the notion “contrary to the Constitution,” which 
is too broad a formula, broader than that of current article 79 (“limit[ing] the 
rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen or contradict[ing] the 
fundamentals of the constitutional system of the russian Federation”).10
article 1 of the amending Law provides for article 79 of the Constitution 
of the russian Federation to be supplemented with a provision stating that 
decisions of interstate bodies taken on the basis of the provisions of the russian 
Federation’s international treaties in an interpretation that is contrary to the 
Constitution of the russian Federation shall not be executed in the russian 
Federation. associated with this is a provision supplementing article 125 of the 
Constitution of the russian Federation, whereby the Constitutional Court of the 
russian Federation, under the procedure established by federal constitutional 
law, shall rule on the possibility of executing decisions of interstate bodies taken 
on the basis of the provisions of the russian Federation’s international treaties in 
an interpretation that is contrary to the Constitution of the russian Federation, 
and also on the possibility of executing decisions of an international/interstate 
court or a foreign or international court of arbitration/mediation placing the 
russian Federation under obligations, where such a decision is contrary to 
the tenets of public order in the russian Federation (sub-paragraph “b” [“б” in 
the original Cyrillic text] of paragraph 51). these provisions, as follows directly 
from their wording, do not prescribe a repudiation by the russian Federation 
of compliance with the international treaties themselves and of the honouring 
of its international obligations and, accordingly, are not contrary to article 15 
(paragraph 4) of the russian Federation Constitution. the given mechanism is 
not intended to establish a repudiation of execution of international treaties 
and the decisions of interstate court bodies based thereon but rather to devise 
a constitutionally acceptable means of executing such decisions by the russian 
Federation while steadfastly safeguarding the supreme legal authority of the 
russian Federation Constitution within the russian legal system, a component 
part of which is constituted by the unilateral and multilateral international 
treaties of russia, including those providing for the corresponding powers of 
interstate courts.11
10  european Commission for democracy through Law, supra note 9.
11  european Commission for democracy through Law (venice Commission), russian Federation, extracts 
from the Conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation n° 1-Z of 16 march 2020, 
opinion no. 981/2020, CdL-reF(2020)022, 30 april 2020 (dec. 1, 2020), available at https://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CdL-reF(2020)022-e.
POLINA VINOGRADOVA, ANDREY TULAEV 147
the european Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereafter “the Convention”) establishes and ensures the observance of 
the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention, 
thereby setting up eCHr (art. 19). the states undertake to abide by the final judgment 
of the Court in any case to which they are parties (art. 46). the Court shall in its 
pilot judgment identify both the nature of the structural or systemic problem or 
other dysfunction as established as well as the type of remedial measures which 
the Contracting Party concerned is required to take at the domestic level by virtue 
of the operative provisions of the judgment (§ 61(3) rules of Court).
the Convention was concluded on the basis of the sovereign equality of States. 
States must respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and 
must effectively resolve violations at the national level. the eCHr acts as a safeguard 
for violations that have not been remedied at the national level. Where the eCHr 
finds a violation, states must abide by the final judgment of the Court. the States 
are obliged to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention and to provide an effective remedy before a national 
authority for everyone whose rights and freedoms are violated. the european Court 
interprets the Convention.12
it is worth noting the opinion of British lawyers that,
one of the first tasks of the initial members of the Council of europe was 
to draw up the european Convention on Human rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, under which, by article 1, the parties agreed to secure to everyone 
“within their jurisdictions” the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.13
in this case,
russian bodies of power proceed from the idea that russia’s participation 
in various international conventions and agreements does not at all mean 
delegating of some or other part of state sovereignty of russia on this level. 
membership in the united nations implies association and not delegating 
of sovereignties. it is on the basis of the idea of united nations and joint 
sovereignties (“pooling sovereignties”) that the united nations organization 
was created.14
12  european Court of Human rights, Brighton declaration (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/documents/2012_Brighton_Finaldeclaration_enG.pdf.
13  nick Phillips, European Human Rights – A Force for Good or a Threat to Democracy, 2 russian Law: 
theory and Practice 6, 8 (2014).
14  valery d. Zorkin, Speech “Constitutional Justice in the transitional Phase of the Historical development 
of russia” at the international Conference in St. Petersburg, 17 may 2016 (dec. 1, 2020), available at 
http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/news/Speech/Pages/viewitem.aspx?Paramid=77.
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in these circumstances the President of the Constitutional Court v. Zorkin 
suggested that,
accordingly, russia’s participation in international agreements and 
conventions only means that russia voluntarily imposes on itself obligations 
enumerated in these international instruments and leaves for itself sovereign 
right of final decisions in accordance with the Constitution of the russian 
Federation, should disputes or legal collisions occur.15
the High Level Conference at interlaken in its declaration of 19 February 2010 
noted that the deficit between applications introduced and applications disposed 
of continued to grow; it considered that this situation caused damage to the 
effectiveness and credibility of the Convention and its supervisory mechanism and 
represented a threat to the quality and the consistency of the case law and the 
authority of the eCHr. the High Level Conference at izmir in its declaration of 27 april 
2011 welcomed the concrete progress achieved following the interlaken Conference. 
the High Level Conference meeting at Brighton on 19 and 20 april 2012 declares,
the jurisprudence of the Court makes clear that the States Parties enjoy 
a margin of appreciation in how they apply and implement the Convention, 
depending on the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms 
engaged. this reflects that the Convention system is subsidiary to the 
safeguarding of human rights at national level and that national authorities are 
in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs 
and conditions. the margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with supervision 
under the Convention system. in this respect, the role of the Court is to review 
whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible with the 
Convention, having due regard to the State’s margin of appreciation.16
v. Zorkin also remarked that,
recognizing objective need of the european Court’s activity in revealing 
structural defects of national legal systems, we expect that the european 
Court will more consistently adhere to the principle of subsidiarity. We hope 
that we will not be presented with a fait accompli of european consensus, 
reached behind our back. agreeing on the whole with this form of legitimation 
15  valery d. Zorkin, Speech “Law of Force and Force of Law” at the international Conference in St. Peters-
burg, 28 may 2015 (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/news/Speech/Pages/viewitem.
aspx?Paramid=71.
16  Brighton declaration, supra note 12.
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of the european Court decisions, we proceed from the assumption that 
european consensus is an informal understanding, which is achieved with our 
direct participation and in the course of which peculiarities of the historical 
development of russia and objective hardships that it comes across on its 
way to law and democracy are taken into account.
at the same time,
interaction of european and constitutional legal orders is impossible in the 
conditions of subordination, only dialogue between different legal systems is 
the basis of their appropriate balance. the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation is ready to act in the spirit of cooperation and dialogue with the 
european Court of Human rights.17
n. Phillips, a former english judge and, until october 2012, the President of the 
Supreme Court of the united Kingdom, considers that,
at the heart of the debate lie three principles that are the creation of the 
Strasbourg Court: the doctrine that the Convention is a “living instrument”; 
the margin of appreciation; and proportionality.18
as to the margin of appreciation he noted,
nonetheless, there have been some occasions, and they have probably 
been a growing number of occasions, where the Court has intervened to 
prefer its own views to that of courts of member States that have not erred 
in the principles that they have applied, but only, in the view of the Court, in 
the result of their application. in some of these cases the Court has afforded 
the member State concerned an insufficient margin of appreciation.19
the High-Level Conference meeting in Brussels on 26 and 27 march 2015 on 
the “implementation of the european Convention on Human rights: our Shared 
responsibility.” Brussels declaration therefore reiterates the determination of 
the States Parties to fulfil their primary obligation to ensure that the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention and its protocols are fully secured at national 
level, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. the Conference underlines 
17  Zorkin, supra note 14.
18  Phillips 2014, at 9.
19  Id. at 13.
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the importance of clear and consistent case-law as well as the Court’s interactions 
with the national authorities and the Committee of ministers.20
recommendation Cm/rec(2008)2 of the Committee of ministers emphasises High 
Contracting Parties’ legal obligation under article 46 of the european Convention 
for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms to abide by all 
final judgments of the eCHr in cases to which they are parties. it reiterates that 
in judgments where the Court finds a violation there is an obligation by the High 
Contracting Parties to: Pay any sums awarded by the Court by way of just satisfaction; 
adopt, where appropriate, individual measures to put an end to the violation found by 
the Court and to redress, as far as possible, its effects; adopt, where appropriate, the 
general measures needed to put an end to similar violations or prevent them.21
in accordance with the wishes of the member States, the Convention was 
amended on 24 June 2013 by the 15th Protocol. on 1 may 2017 the Federal Law 
ratifying Protocol no. 15 was signed, amending the Convention for the Protection 
of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms. as a preamble to the Convention, 
the Protocol introduces a reference to the eCHr subsidiarity with regard to national 
courts and underscores the existence of participant states’ margin of appreciation in 
implementing the Convention at the national level.22 in line with Protocol no. 15 in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, states have the primary responsibility 
to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols 
there to, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the eCHr established by Convention.
russia is not entitled to conclude international treaties not conforming to the 
Constitution of the russian Federation, – otherwise they may not be brought into effect 
and applied in the russian Federation, i.e. may not be ratified. the Convention,
as an international treaty of the russian Federation is an integral part of 
its legal system and, therefore, the State is obliged to execute a judgment of 
the european Court of Human rights, passed on the basis of the provisions 
of the Convention on a complaint against russia with respect to persons 
participating in the case and within the framework of a specific subject-matter 
of a dispute; in this case realization of measures envisaged by the judgment 
20  Brussels declaration, High-Level Conference on the “implementation of the european Convention 
on Human rights: our Shared responsibility,” 27 march 2015 (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/documents/Brussels_declaration_enG.pdf.
21  recommendation Cm/rec(2008)2 of the Committee of ministers to member states on efficient domestic 
capacity for rapid execution of judgments of the european Court of Human rights, adopted by the 
Committee of ministers on 6 February 2008 at the 1017th meeting of the ministers’ deputies (dec. 1, 
2020), available at https://www.echr.am/resources/echr//pdf/25811f0ffa3ff0ed7f9fdf4f1f1bc011.pdf.
22  Law ratifying Protocol no. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, President of russia, 1 may 2017 (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://en.kremlin.
ru/acts/news/54417.
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of the european Court of Human rights – both of individual and general 
character – must be carried out in accordance with article 15 (Section 4) of 
the Constitution of the russian Federation also on the basis of recognition 
of such judgment as an integral part of russia’s legal system.23
article 85 of the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the 
russian Federation establishes a request to the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation to verify the constitutionality of state actions shall be admissible if the 
petitioner deems them either unenforceable due to their unconstitutionality or 
enforceable notwithstanding the officially adopted by an inter-State body for the 
protection of human rights and freedoms, in which violation of human rights and 
freedoms by the russian Federation in the course of application of a respective 
normative act or treaty and the need to make amendments to them eliminating 
the said violations are ascertained.
ruling no. 21-P of 14 July 2015 of the Constitutional Court marks a new stage in 
the development of law-enforcement practices in correlation between national and 
international law. in addition, the decision made should be considered as an aim 
to avoid serious complications in a situation in which an eCHr decision implies the 
introduction into russian legislation of changes fraught with the violation of civil 
and political rights and freedoms fixed by the russian Constitution.
an eCHr ruling cannot be considered binding if the Court, when interpreting 
it during a trial, attaches another, rather than its usual, meaning to a notion used 
or interprets it contrary to the Convention’s object and goals. in this case, the state 
concerning which a ruling has been made has a right to refuse to execute it as 
a ruling that goes beyond the limits of obligations voluntarily assumed by this state 
when it ratified the european Convention for the Protection of Human rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. in addition, eCHr makes a reservation that in such cases, 
it is impossible to observe the obligation to use a rule of an international treaty 
interpreted by an interstate body within the consideration of a specific case. if the 
interpretation of a rule of an international treaty violates constitutional provisions, 
the russian Federation cannot execute a decision of an interstate body regarding 
individual and general measures imposed on it. the issue of the valid meaning of 
corresponding provisions in the context of an arising contradiction and russia’s 
international obligations shall be settled pursuant to constitutional proceedings.
the legal basis for considering requests about the possibility to execute a decision 
of an interstate body to protect human rights and freedoms are the provisions of 
articles 104.1–104.3 of the Federal Constitutional Law. the Federal Constitutional 
23  By the judgment of 14 July 2015 no. 21-P/2015 the Constitutional Court gave appraisal of constitu-
tionality of the provisions of article 1 of the Federal Law “on ratification of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Protocols thereto,” etc. (dec. 1, 2020), 
available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/decision/Judgments/documents/resume%202015%2021-П.pdf.
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Law developed in connection with the Constitutional Court ruling of 14 July 2015 
no. 21-P establishes the authority of the Constitutional Court to rule on the possibility 
of complying with the ruling of an interstate body protecting human rights and 
freedoms proceeding from the supremacy and supreme judicial power of the 
Constitution of the russian Federation and sets the procedure the Constitutional 
Court will follow in considering such matters.
under the Federal Constitutional Law, a request to enforce a resolution by 
an interstate body responsible for protection of human rights and freedoms 
can be filed with the Constitutional Court by a federal executive body of power 
authorised to ensure the protection of russia’s interests during consideration 
by an interstate body responsible for protection of human rights and freedoms 
of complaints filed against the russian Federation based on an international 
agreement of the russian Federation. Following the consideration of the 
case, the Constitutional Court shall rule on the possibility or impossibility 
to enforce the resolution of such interstate body responsible for protection 
of human rights and freedoms under the russian Constitution. the Federal 
Constitutional Law establishes the right of the President and the Government 
of russia to turn to the Constitutional Court with a request to interpret clauses 
of the russian Constitution to avoid uncertainty in their understanding in 
view of any contradiction that may arise between provisions of a russian 
Federation international agreement as interpreted by an interstate body 
responsible for protection of human rights and freedoms, and provisions of 
the russian Constitution as it applies to the possibility of complying with the 
ruling of the appropriate interstate body.24
on 22 September 2020, russian President vladimir Putin submitted to the 
State duma the draft, “on amendments to Federal Constitutional Law ‘on the 
Constitutional Court of the russian Federation.’” the draft provides for significant 
changes to the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court in the 
procedure for the formation and powers of the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation and is aimed at implementing the provisions of part 3 of article 107, 
part 2 of article 108, article 125, parts 1 and 3 of article 128 of the Constitution of 
the russian Federation.
the draft brings the Constitution of the russian Federation into line with the 
concept of the Constitutional Court as the highest judicial body of constitutional 
control in the russian Federation, exercising judicial power independently and 
through constitutional legal proceedings in order to protect the foundations of the 
24  amendments to Law on Constitutional Court (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/
news/50935.
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constitutional system, fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms and ensure 
the supremacy and direct operation of the Constitution of the russian Federation 
throughout the russian Federation.
the Federal Constitutional Law stipulates that the constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation consists of 11 judges, including the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of 
the russian Federation and his deputy. in the event of retirement of any of the judges 
of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation or the number of judges becomes 
less than 8, the President of the russian Federation may nominate another individual 
for the vacant position of a judge to the Federation Council within one month from 
the date of opening of the vacancy. the Constitutional Court is authorized to make 
decisions in sessions if there are at least 6 of the number of active judges.
the draft supplements the requirements for a candidate for the position of judge 
of the Constitutional Court with provisions on the need for permanent residence in 
the russian Federation, the absence of citizenship of a foreign state, or a residence 
permit or other document confirming the right to permanent residence of a citizen 
of the russian Federation on the territory of a foreign state.
it is established that the judge of the Constitutional Court is subject to the 
prohibitions and restrictions provided for by the Federal law regulating the status 
of judges, including the prohibition to open and have accounts (deposits), store 
cash and valuables in foreign banks located outside the territory of the russian 
Federation, own and (or) use foreign financial instruments.
the list of grounds for terminating the powers of a judge of the constitutional 
Court is clarified and supplemented. it is stipulated that the powers of a judge of 
the Constitutional Court are also terminated due to the acquisition of citizenship of 
a foreign state or obtaining a residence permit or other document confirming the 
right to permanent residence of a citizen of the russian Federation on the territory 
of a foreign state.
the procedure for terminating the powers of a judge of the Constitutional Court 
is specified. it is stipulated that the termination of the powers of the Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court, the deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Court and judges of 
the Constitutional Court may be carried out by the Constitutional Court. in the event 
that they commit an act discrediting the honor and dignity of a judge and in all other 
cases provided for by law no. 1-FKZ, indicating that the judge cannot exercise his/
her powers, the termination of the powers may be carried out also by the Federation 
Council on the proposal of the President of the russian Federation.
in the event that a judge of the Constitutional Court has their powers terminated, the 
decision of the Constitutional Court is send to the President of the russian Federation 
and the Federation Council and is considered the official notice of vacancy.
termination of powers of a judge of the Constitutional Court by the Federation 
Council on representation of the President of the russian Federation is possible due to 
1) violations of the procedure for the appointment of the judge of the Constitutional 
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Court to a position; 2) non-compliance with the appointment requirements for 
candidate for the position of a judge of the Constitutional Court; 3)the forfeiture of 
citizenship of the russian Federation by the judge; 4) the acquisition of citizenship 
of the foreign state or residence permit or other document confirming the right to 
permanent residence of a of the russian Federation on the territory of a foreign state; 
5) a verdict of guilty that has entered into legal force against a judge 6) commission 
of an act that defames the honor and dignity of a judge; 7) engaging in activities or 
performing actions that are incompatible with the position of a judge.
the procedure for the review by the Constitutional Court of the request of the 
President of the russian Federation about check of constitutionality of drafts on 
the amendment of the Constitution of the russian Federation, projects of Federal 
constitutional laws and Federal laws adopted in the prescribed manner of the laws 
before their signing by the President of the russian Federation and also laws of 
subjects of the russian Federation prior to their publication of the higher official of 
the subject of the russian Federation is established.
the draft clarifies the powers of the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation. in particular, it is determined that the Constitutional Court checks the 
constitutionality of Federal Constitutional laws, Federal laws, normative acts of the 
President of the russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State duma, the 
government of the russian Federation, the constitutions of republics, charters, as 
well as laws and other normative acts of the subjects of the russian Federation 
issued by the following by the following parties: State authorities of the russian 
Federation and joint jurisdiction of state authorities of the russian Federation and 
state authorities of subjects of the russian Federation. thus, the list of objects of 
constitutional judicial control over complaints of violation of constitutional rights 
and freedoms is being expanded.
the list of subjects that have the right to appeal on this basis is also expanding. 
under the draft the right to such treatment is granted to citizens, legal persons 
and their interests – the ombudsman for human rights in the russian Federation, 
ombudsmеn for human rights in constituent entities of the russian Federation, 
other ombudsmеn in certain areas or certain categories of persons stipulated by the 
Federal law, as well as other bodies and officials in accordance with Federal law and 
nationwide organizations which, in accordance with the Federal law can represent 
the interests of citizens and legal entities.
the amendments also provide a new list of criteria for the admissibility of 
complaints about violations of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens 
and legal entities by a regulatory act.
according to the amendments the claim of a violation of constitutional rights 
and freedoms by the regulatory act shall be admissible if 1) there is evidence 
(trappings/signs) of violation of rights and freedoms of the applicant or person in 
whose interests a complaint to the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation as 
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a result of application of the contested normative act in a particular case involving 
such person; 2) the complaint was filed not later than one year after the adoption 
of a judicial decision that exhausted domestic remedies and if a retrial by the court 
whose decision is usually exhausting domestic remedies in those cases was denied 
due to the omission of the term appeal – not later than one year after the final 
judicial decision which had applied the relevant regulations; 3) all other domestic 
means of judicial protection of the rights of the applicant or the person in whose 
interests the complaint is filed with the Constitutional Court have been exhausted 
in resolving a specific case.
thus, under the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” refers to filing in accordance 
with the laws of the relevant type of proceedings by the applicant or person in whose 
interests a complaint to the Constitutional Court, appeal to the highest court for this 
category of cases or, if enforceable judicial acts on this category of cases are subjects 
to appeal only in the Supervisory review process if the judicial act, which has applied 
the challenged normative act, was the subject of a cassation or Supervisory appeal 
in connection with the application of this normative act and the filing of a cassation 
or Supervisory appeal did not eliminate signs of violation of the rights of such an 
applicant or person.
the Constitutional Court may also recognize domestic remedies as exhausted 
if the established law enforcement practice of the court, whose decision usually 
exhausts domestic remedies in the relevant category of cases, or the official 
interpretation of the contested normative act given in explanations on judicial 
practice in order to ensure uniform application of the legislation of the russian 
Federation, indicates that the application of the contested normative act is different 
from that which took place in a particular case not assumed.
the draft specifies the procedure for consideration by the Constitutional Court 
of cases on the possibility of execution of decisions of the interstate body for the 
protection of human rights and freedoms. it is established that the President of the 
russian Federation, the Government of the russian Federation, the Supreme court 
of the russian Federation and Federal executive authorities vested with competence 
in the field of supporting activities for the protection of the interests of the russian 
Federation in an interstate authority may apply to the Constitutional Court with 
inquiries about the possibility of executing decisions of an interstate body due to the 
fact that in obliging the russian Federation to take measures for its implementation, 
this decision is based on the provisions of the international treaty of the russian 
Federation in the interpretation, presumably leading to their discrepancy with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the russian Federation.
the draft establishes the procedure for considering cases with the possibility of 
enforcement of decisions of foreign or international (interstate) courts and foreign 
or international arbitration courts (arbitrations). it stipulates that the President of 
the russian Federation, the Government of the russian Federation and the Supreme 
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Court of the russian Federation have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court 
with a request of execution of decisions of foreign or international (interstate) courts 
and foreign or international arbitration courts (arbitration) which impose obligations 
on the russian Federation.
Such a request is acceptable if the applicant believes that the execution of the 
decision is impossible because it contradicts the principles of public law and order of 
the russian Federation; the decision imposes obligations on the russian Federation 
both directly and through the imposition of obligations on individual Federal state 
bodies or organizations belonging to the russian Federation; decision is based on 
a deviation from the usual meanings of terms used in the document under which 
it is adopted or their context, or on a deviation from the object, purpose or content 
of this document, or on non-compliance with the limits of competence in making 
such a decision; in the system of current legal regulation, including international 
legal regulation, there is no possibility of refusal to execute the decision within the 
framework of ordinary law enforcement.
the draft provides the power of the Supreme Court not later than 2 months after 
the publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court to provide an explanation 
on issues of judicial practice in order to ensure uniform application of the legislation 
in terms of the contested norms.
according to the amendment provided in the draft, a document confirming the 
right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as well as the admissibility of such an 
appeal, is attached to the application sent to the Constitutional Court.
the draft also contains a number of provisions aimed to improve the organizational 
framework of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation.
the introduction of these amendments to the Federal constitutional law “on the 
Constitutional Court of the russian Federation” will help strengthen the role of the 
Supreme judicial body of constitutional control.
2. Positions of the Constitutional Court
the Constitutional Court resorted to the possibility of executing decisions of the 
european Court on Human rights within the framework of the russian legal system 
in resolutions of 27 march 2012; 14 July 2015; 19 april 2016; and 19 January 2017.
on 14 July 2015 the Constitutional Court announced its judgement on consti-
tutionality of the Federal Law “on the accession of the russian Federation to 
the european Convention on Human rights” and of the provisions of the federal 
legislation, which pertain to the enforcement of the Judgments of the eCHr by 
the russian Federation. according to the legal position of the Constitutional Court, 
court carrying out proceedings of reconsideration of a judicial act having entered 
into legal force on application of a person, on whose complaint the eCHr passed 
a judgment, ascertaining violation of the Convention by the provisions of the russian 
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legislation, applied in this person’s case, is obliged to suspend proceedings and 
petition the Constitutional Court with a request to review their conformity to the 
Constitution. State bodies, entrusted with the obligation to ensure fulfilment by 
the russian Federation of international treaties of which it is a party, having come 
to the conclusion on impossibility of executing a judgment of the eCHr passed 
on a complaint against russia because, in obliging the russian Federation to take 
measures of individual and/or common nature it is based on the provisions of the 
Convention in the interpretation leading to its divergence with the Constitution, are 
entitled to petition the Constitutional Court for the solution of the question on the 
possibility to execute the judgment of the eCHr and take measures of individual 
and common character, aimed at ensuring the fulfilment of this Convention. 
Should the Constitutional Court come to the conclusion that the judgment of the 
eCHr, so far as it is based on the Convention in the interpretation contradicting 
the Constitution, cannot be executed, such judgment in this part is not subject to 
execution. the President and Government of the russian Federation having come 
to the conclusion on the impossibility to execute a judgment of the eCHr passed on 
a complaint against russia, because in the part obliging the russia to take measures 
of individual and common character it is based on the provisions of the Convention 
in the interpretation leading to their divergence with the Constitution, are entitled to 
petition the Constitutional Court with a request to interpret respective provisions of 
the Constitution with the aim to eliminate uncertainty in their understanding, bearing 
in mind the revealed conflict and international obligations of russia as applied to the 
possibility to execute the judgment of the eCHr and to take measures of individual 
and common character aimed at ensuring fulfilment of the Convention.25
in this context the President of the Constitutional Court v. Zorkin noted,
the Convention in its interpretation by the european Court possessed 
stronger legal force than a federal law, but not the one equal or stronger than 
legal force of the Constitution of the russian Federation.26
the reasoning of the rF CC ruling is that due to the primacy of the Constitution, 
international law provisions shall be interpreted as specification of the Constitutional 
provisions, but they cannot be applied if they go beyond the scope of the legal sense 
that is enshrined in the Constitution.27
25  Constitutional Court, supra note 23.
26  Zorkin, supra note 15.
27  ref.: Зорькин В.Д. Право силы и сила права // Журнал конституционного правосудия. 2015. № 5. С. 6 
[valery d. Zorkin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 5 Journal of Constitutional Justice 1, 6 (2015)]; 
nikolai S. Bondar, The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the National and Supranational 
Systems of Jurisdictional Bodies: Cooperation and Competition, 4(1) Kutafin university Law review 2, 
25 (2017).
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on 19 april 2016 the Constitutional Court has pronounced its judgment on the 
applicability of the judgment of the eCHr of 4 July 2013 in the case of Anchugov 
and Gladkov v. Russia (applications nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05). the Constitutional 
Court has recognized as possible and realizable in russia’s legislation and judicial 
practice execution of this Judgment of the eCHr with regard to measures of general 
character, ensuring justice, proportionality and differentiation of application of the 
restriction of electoral rights, so far as in accordance with the Constitution and 
the provisions of the Criminal Code. the execution of the said the judgment of 
the eCHr with regard to measures of individual character, which are stipulated by 
the operating legislation of the russian Federation with respect to russia’s citizens 
has been recognized as impossible, since these citizens had been sentenced to 
deprivation of liberty for a long term for the commission of particularly grave crimes 
and therefore could not count, even according to criteria elaborated by the european 
Court, on access to electoral rights.28
in the opinion of the european Commission for democracy through Law (venice 
Commission) it was written that,
it is true that the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation has 
demonstrated a certain openness to dialogue with the european Court of 
Human rights. in its judgment in the case of anchugov and Gladkov, the 
Court affirmed that the Strasbourg judgment could not be executed but at the 
same time indicated to the federal legislator a way out of the impasse. on the 
basis of these indications, the legislation was amended and the Committee 
of ministers considered that the judgment had been fully executed. the case 
of anchugov and Gladkov indeed demonstrates that constitutional hurdles 
may be addressed, which is what has happened, over time, in other Council 
of europe member States.29
in its judgment the eCHr suggested to russia that it execute its decision through 
some form of political process or by interpreting the Constitution by the competent 
authorities in harmony with the Convention in such a way as to coordinate their 
effects and avoid any conflict between them. the Constitutional Court supposes 
that such an interpretation of the articles of the Constitution in interconnection with 
the provisions of the Criminal Code and judicial practice suggested by the present 
judgment allows to avoid similar collisions concerning restrictions of electoral rights 
of citizens staying in places of deprivation of liberty under a court sentence.30
28  By the judgment of 19 april 2016 no. 12-P/2016 the Constitutional Court resolved the question of the 
possibility to execute in accordance with the Constitution of the russian Federation the Judgment of 
the european Court of Human rights of 4 July 2013 in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia (dec. 1, 
2020), available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/decision/Judgments/documents/resume19042016.pdf.
29  european Commission for democracy through Law, supra note 9.
30  Constitutional Court, supra note 23.
POLINA VINOGRADOVA, ANDREY TULAEV 159
v. Zorkin returned to this issue in a speech at the international Conference, “modern 
Constitutional Justice: Challenges and Perspectives” on 17 may 2016, saying,
[the] european Court was not taking into account the fact that applicants 
were contesting not simply a rule of law (which in itself meant the need that 
the state should take measures of general nature), but a norm of the country’s 
Constitution. moreover, the norm which may be altered solely as a result of 
adoption of a new Constitution.31
in the opinion of the judge of the Constitutional Court n. Bondar,
the eCHr decision dated July 4, 2013 in anchugov and Gladkov vs. the 
russian Federation, in compliance with which the eCHr, in fact, challenged one 
of the provisions of the Constitution of the rF (Part 3 art. 32), became a serious 
manifestation of value conflicts that emerge due to the interaction between the 
jurisdiction under the european Convention and the russian national consti-
tutional system. at the same time, in the rF CC ruling dated april 19, 2016  
no. 12-P the Court, dealing with the question concerning the possibility of 
execution of the eCHr decision, evinced a flexible, constructive approach 
indicating existing options for implementation of the act of the jurisdiction under 
the european Convention that are consistent with the Constitution of the rF.32
in the opinion of Julia Haak,
the violation of the Convention consists solely of the automatic occurring 
prohibition of the right to vote in every conviction to a deprivation of liberty, 
without any differentiation. an appropriate solution would be not to deprive 
every condemned person of the right to vote, one of the most important 
fundamental rights in a democracy. this approach, which would be achieved 
by a corresponding amendment to the federal laws, could solve the loudly 
raised conflict between the russian Constitution and the eCHr.33
on 19 January 2017 the Constitutional Court decided that it is impossible to 
enforce the eCHr judgement of 31 July 2014 in the case OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya 
31  Зорькин В.Д. Конституционная юстиция на переходном этапе исторического развития России // 
Конституционный Суд РФ. 17 мая 2016 г. [valery d. Zorkin, Constitutional Justice at the Transitional 
Stage of Russia’s Historical Development, Constitutional Court of the russian Federation, 17 may 2016] 
(dec. 1, 2020), available at http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/news/Speech/Pages/viewitem.aspx?Paramid=75.
32  Bondar 2017, at 26.
33  yulia Haak, Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Decision from 19 April 2016, No. 12-P/16. An 
Assessment from a German Point of View, 6 Journal of Siberian Federal university. Humanities & Social 
Sciences 845, 848 (2017).
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Yukos v. Russia. However it did not exclude the possibility to protect the interests of 
shareholders suffering from unlawful actions of the company’s management. the 
Constitution has the supreme legal force within the legal system of russia. according 
to the legal position of the Constitutional Court, the judgements of the eCHr do not 
deny the priority of the Constitution in the latter’s legal system. When deciding the 
Constitutional Court has held, 
not denying the rule of application of sanctions in respect of tax evasion, 
the Constitutional Court revealed the only possible, from the perspective 
of the Constitution, meaning thereof regarding their application in respect 
of unscrupulous taxpayers. tax evasion of the ‘oao neftyanaya Kompaniya 
yukos’ in such an unprecedented scale directly threatened principles of the 
rule of law in a democratic social state which obliged the authorities to act in 
the course of enforcement proceedings as effective as possible with regard 
to overcome resistance of unscrupulous taxpayers … However the russian 
Federation acting in a good faith can make certain payments to former 
shareholders of the Company who suffered from unlawful actions of the 
latter’s management by means of newly detectable property of the yuKoS.
Broadly speaking this means that,
when a decision of an international body interpreting provisions of an 
international treaty unlawfully concerns fundamentals of the Constitution, russia 
has an exceptional right to deviate from enforcement of this decision.34
in the latter, the Constitutional Court withdrew from considering the procedural 
aspects of the eCHr decision to which the russian ministry of Justice had drawn 
attention, since otherwise it would have meant that the above decision had been 
assessed in terms of the relevance of procedural rules applied and procedural 
decisions based on them.
it follows from the adduced legal position, expounded in the judgment no. 21-P, 
that the Constitutional Court as the last instance of resolving, within the framework 
of the operating constitutional regulation, of the question of the possibility to 
execute judgments of the eCHr as the interstate body for the protection of human 
rights and freedoms must, in accordance with international obligations of russia, 
find reasonable balance in carrying out this power, so that the decision taken by 
it should, on the one hand, answer the letter and spirit of a judgment of the eCHr 
34  on 19 January 2017 the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation pronounced its judgement 
on the possibility of enforcement of the european Court of Human rights judgement of 31 July 2014 
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (dec. 1, 2020), available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/news/
Pages/viewitem.aspx?Paramid=1970.
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and on the other – not come into a conflict with the fundamental principles of the 
constitutional order and legal regulation of human and civil rights and freedoms 
established by the Constitution of the russian Federation.35
3. Discussion and Conclusion
the President of the Constitutional Court v. Zorkin noted that,
Having signed the european Convention for the Protection of Human 
rights and Fundamental Freedoms, russia with due reasons recognized itself 
as a part of the european political and legal expanse. But we are entitled to 
expect that peculiarities of our country and difficulties which it comes across 
in the course of its entry in the european legal expanse will be taken into 
account in the forming of legal standards of the Council of europe.
in this context he remarked:
Besides, the russian Constitution, unlike the european Convention, is 
a much more comprehensive and detailed document, whose provisions 
constitute a united, internally accorded normative system. all this means 
that the bounds of activism of a national body of constitutional control are 
not as wide as those of its supra-national vis-à-vis.36
in the opinion of the judge of the Constitutional Court a. Kokotov, as long as 
in the course of constitutional judicial proceedings the provisions in question are 
found conforming to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court within the framework 
of its competence should define the possible constitutional ways of executing the 
judgment passed by the eCHr.
the Constitutional Court’s decisions form a significant channel for 
introducing legal positions of international judicial authorities into russian 
law. therefore, by specifying conclusions of the european court of Human 
rights as regards their compatibility with particularities of russian legislation 
and of its own decisions, the rF Constitutional Court solves the problem of 
implementing provisions of the Convention on Protection of Human rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and of the european Court’s resolutions into 
russian legislation. Consequently, the Constitutional Court’s legal positions 
can be considered as an instrument similar to general measures on execution 
35  Constitutional Court, supra note 23.
36  Zorkin, supra note 14.
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of the european Court’s resolutions if the latter are not just seen as procedures 
for enforcement of certain rulings in cases to which russia was a party.37
the judge of the Constitutional Court n. Bondar noted,
it cannot, however, be denied that there are some decisions of the eCHr 
that unambiguously demonstrate double standards and a lack of polyphony 
of european constitutionalism … this problem concerns the balance between 
the european consensus and the national constitutional identity, meaning 
that the concept of “european consensus” is sometimes used to the detriment 
of constitutional pluralism and “constitutional polyphony” as the part of 
a european constitutional area. While elaborating the mechanisms of resolving 
conflicts between national jurisdictional bodies and the eCHr, it is necessary 
to take into account that conflicts per se including those that arise as a result 
of correlation and confrontation between national and supranational law 
have constitutional significance. and all disputes that are constitutional due 
to their legal nature, character and consequences are subject to settlement 
by means of constitutional procedures …
it is evident that the character of relations between the Constitutional 
Court of the russian Federation and the european Court of Human rights are 
not defined, by any means, by conflicts that emerge between the jurisdiction 
under the Convention and the national constitutional jurisdiction.38
this confirms the legality of the Constitutional Court’s approach, which ensures 
the search for a valid compromise to maintain the international system of protection 
of rights and freedoms. the objective of the russian highest body of constitutional 
control is to ensure a reasonable balance so that, on the one hand, a decision made 
would meet the letter and intent of a decision of an international court of justice and, 
on the other, would not contravene the foundations of the russian constitutional 
order and the legal regulation of civil and political rights and freedoms established 
by the Constitution of the russian Federation.
the execution of the condition of exhausting domestic remedies remains 
a debatable issue. the High Level Conference at Brighton on 19 and 20 april 2012 
in its declaration invites the european Court of Human rights to develop its case 
law on the exhaustion of domestic remedies so as to require an applicant, where 
a domestic remedy was available to them, to have argued before the national courts 
or tribunals the alleged violation of the Convention rights or an equivalent provision 
37  alexander n. Kokotov, On the Lawmaking Matters of the Acts of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation, 1 russian Law: theory and Practice 6, 11 (2015).
38  Bondar 2017, at 24, 26.
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of domestic law, thereby allowing the national courts an opportunity to apply the 
european Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedom 
sin light of the case law of the eCHr. the Constitutional Court stated that the role of 
the european Court, additional to the national mechanism of human rights remedy, 
is predetermined by the necessity to be protected primarily by all courts of the 
russian Federation, including the Supreme Court (which is the highest court for civil, 
economic, criminal and administrative cases and which also protects human rights 
and freedoms by considering cassation and supervisory complaints against final and 
binding court rulings) and the Constitutional Court (which, as the highest court body 
of constitutional control, considers cases of citizens’ complaints about the violation 
of constitutional rights and freedoms by a law applied by state bodies).
if a decision of an interstate body contains an instruction based on interpretation 
of an international treaty that illegitimately affects the fundamental principles and 
rules of the russian Constitution, russia, on an exceptional basis, may derogate 
from the execution of obligations imposed on it by this decision if this derogation 
is the only possible way to avoid the violation of the russian Constitution. Such 
a derogation is possible in cases of conventional and constitutional collisions, which, 
as a rule, concern not so much the main content (essence) of various rights and 
freedoms as such but their concrete definitions. For example, eCHr rulings contain 
interpretations that result in the negation, unmotivated by the literal content of the 
Convention, of legal constructs that have emerged in the russian legal system.
the role of international organizations in the contemporary world is hard to 
overestimate, but we should not forget that states are the only holders of sovereignty, 
which should not be violated either by independent sovereign states or by the 
activities of international judicial bodies. State sovereignty, which took the global 
community centuries to recognize, is an earnest of international stability. international 
organizations cannot determine the development of international relations, because 
this function contradicts their legal nature as platforms that elaborate approaches 
to solve international disputes and the acceptance of these approaches remains an 
act of good will for every independent subject of international law.
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